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The field of securities law is governed by statutes, rules and regula-
tions. These express provisions, so carefully set forth by Congress and
the SEC, have oft been the tortured victim of a frustrated advocate at-
tempting to serve his client. The purpose of this article is to present the
results of these attempts as they relate to the Securities Act of 1933' and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The cases considered are those de-
cided between November 1964 and January 1966.
I. DEFINITIONS
Section 2' of the Securities Act and section 34 of the Exchange Act
define all of the important terms used in both pieces of legislation. "Secu-
rity" as used in the Securities Act is perhaps the most widely litigated
terms since a security must be found to exist before many of the provi-
sions of either act may be utilized.
In SEC v. Bill Willoughby Coin Exchange,' the Commission sought
to restrain and enjoin the defendant-partnership from engaging in prac-
* Assistant Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Freshman
Research and Writing.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the Exchange Act].
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1964).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1964).
5. E.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Herr, 338
F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965);
Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807 (1965).
6. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,355 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 1964). Accord, SEC v. Comstock
Coin Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP,. 91,414 (D. Nev. June 16, 1964).
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tices constituting violations of section 5,7 i.e., sale of a security without
a registration statement in effect. The partnership had solicited funds
from the general public through magazines of national distribution; these
funds were used to buy and sell coins for a profit. If a solicitee became
an investor, he received a contract which entitled him to share in the
partnership's anticipated earnings. The contract also provided that the
investor agreed to give the partnership complete discretion in the purchase
and sale of the coins, while the partnership agreed to use diligence in
such transactions. Before determining whether the contract received by
the investor was a security, the court repeated the familiar guideline
that the term "security" is to be broadly construed to achieve the pur-
poses for which the act was designed. The judge then quoted with ap-
proval the Howey8 test:
[A security is] a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enter-
prise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal inter-
ests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.'
In deciding that the contract issued by the partnership was a security,
the court declared that all the elements of a profit seeking business ven-
ture were present: "investors provide the capital and share in the profits
while defendants manage, operate and control the business."' 0
The terms "purchase" and "sale" as used in the Exchange Act 1
are also words of art which have been the subject of much litigation.
As will be seen later, many of the suits brought pursuant to section 16(b)' 2
have turned upon the existence of a purchase or sale.'" The issue also
arises when the plaintiff sues under Rule 10b-514 since the fraud must
take place "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." In
Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.,5 the defendant urged that there could be no
liability under Rule 10b-5 since there was no sale but only the mere
issuance of stock by the corporation. The court found no difficulty in
holding the issuance to be a sale, since the term is defined so broadly to
include "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of" a security. More-
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
8. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
9. Supra note 6, at 1 94,517. (Emphasis added.)
10. Ibid.
11. Purchase is defined in § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964). Sale is defined
in § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1964).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 7RD(b) (1964). Section 16 was amended by 78 Stat. 565 (1964), which
extended the section's application to certain over-the-counter securities.
13. lra notes 69 et seq. and the accompanying text.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
15. 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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over the court determined that the purpose of the Exchange Act would
best be served by declaring such transaction to be a sale.' "
II. EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS' 7
A registration statement must be in effect before a security may be
sold, unless the security or transaction is exempt under sections 38 or
419 of the Securities Act.
Section 3(a)(10)20 provides for an exemption in certain types of
re-organization issues which are supervised by a court or administrative
agency. The exemption requires a hearing "at which all persons to whom
it is proposed to issue securities .. .shall have a right to appear." In
SEC v. Granco Prods., Inc.,2' the insolvent defendant-corporation be-
came subject to an arrangement proceeding under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act.2 Pursuant to this proceeding, a plan was devised where-
by the corporation issued shares of stock to various underwriters, who,
in turn, were to sell the shares for the benefit of the creditors. The
corporation and underwriters unsuccessfully sought to be relieved from
registration requirements by seeking to fall within the re-organization
exemption. The court felt that the plan was nothing more than a scheme
devised to induce an unwary public to pay for the losses sustained by
the creditors of the corporation. The SEC established a prima facie case
that a registration statement was required by showing that the securities
were to be received by the public, and not creditors, and that the public
"could not and did not participate in the Chapter XI proceedings upon
which the asserted exemption from registration is based.""
A more commonly used exemption is contained in section 3 (a) (11) ,24
the intrastate offer or sale of a security. To fall within this exemption
the following conditions must be met: (1) the issue must be offered and
sold only to persons residing within a single state, i.e., state A; (2) if
the issuer is an individual, he must be a resident of state A, or if a
corporation, it must be incorporated by state A; and (3) the issuer must
be doing business within state A. Upon reviewing an order denying the
16. Accord, Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
17. Though some of the exemptions considered may be contained in § 3, Exempt
Securities, and not in § 4, Exempted Transactions, they are more similar to an exempt
transaction. The exemptions are only good for the one transaction and may have to be
registered in a subsequent sale. See SowAns, Busnmss ORGANIZATIONS-SECURITIES REGULA-
TOiN-FEDERAL SECURIES ACT § 3.01(2) (1965).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1964).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1964).
21. 236 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1964).
23. Id. at 971.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1964).
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petitioner's application for registration as a broker-dealer, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC,25 affirmed a
prior Commission finding which had held that the petitioners had vio-
lated the Securities Act by not registering for the sale of an interstate
issue. The Commission had held that, notwithstanding the fact that the
stock was sold to a resident, if the resident purchased the security for
someone living in another state, and did, in fact, transfer to the non-
resident, the issue was not entitled to the intrastate exemption. Without
saying so, the court appeared to have adopted the "come to rest" test.
This test requires the court to ask the vague question of whether the
security had "come to rest" in the resident state before being trans-
ferred to a subsequent holder across the state border. Because of this
violation and others, the court affirmed the SEC's order which had denied
the petitioner's application for registration as a broker-dealer.
Before leaving this section26 it should be pointed out that the exemp-
tion afforded by sections 3 and 4 only extend to the registration require-
ments under section 5. Therefore, although a security may be exempt
from registration as part of an intrastate issue, civil or criminal liability
may attach if the securities are distributed by use of the mailsY.2
III. CIVIL LIABILITY
A. False Registration Statement
Section 1128 provides that, among others, the underwriters of an
issue that is distributed under a false registration statement may be
civilly liable to any person acquiring a security of that issue. In Rudnick
v. Franchard Corp.,29 the plaintiff brought suit against an underwriter
pursuant to section 11. The facts revealed that two underwritings had
occurred and that the defendant had underwritten only the first issue.
The plaintiff purchased a portion of his stock under, and as a part of,
the second underwriting. He purchased the remainder on the open market
about fourteen months later. In deciding that defendant's motion for
summary judgment should be granted, the court first turned its attention
to the plaintiff's initial purchase which was made as a part of the second
underwriting. The defendant was obviously not liable since he was not
the "underwriter with respect to such security" purchased by the plain-
tiff as required in section 11 (a) (5). Nor was the defendant liable for any
25. 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965).
26. For a discussion of the private offering exemption, see note 32 infra and accompany-
ing text.
27. Section 4 expressly provides that the exemptions included therein apply only to § 5
registration requirements. Although § 3 contains no such provision, §§ 12(2) and 17, which
are concerned with civil and criminal liability, both expressly provide that they apply to
securities exempt by § 3.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
29. 237 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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damages accruing to the plaintiff by virtue of his open market purchases.
These purchases were transacted after the issuer had made generally
available to its security holders an earnings statement covering a period of
at least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the first
registration statement. Under these conditions, the terms of section 11 (a)
require the plaintiff to prove that he relied upon the representation con-
tained in the first registration statement. Reliance may be established
without proof that the plaintiff actually read the statement; it may
be proven by demonstrating that he engaged in conversations with persons
who knew of the contents of the statements and that these persons based
their opinions on its contents. Despite this apparent ease in proving
reliance, the court found none to exist. Accordingly the motion for sum-
mary judgment was properly granted.
B. Violations of Section 5
Section 12(1)0 provides: "any person who offers or sells a security
in violation of section 5 ... shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him . . . to recover the consideration paid for such
security . . . ." In Fuller v. Dilbert,3 ' the guarantor of a stock purchase
agreement sought a declaratory judgment that the agreement was void
and unenforceable. The basis for the guarantor's suit was that the sale by
the issuer was in violation of section 5. This would constitute a section
12 (1) offense, and since the stock purchase agreement was still executory
it could be declared void and unenforceable inasmuch as section 12
provides for the recovery of any consideration paid.
The facts of the case were that the guarantor's guarantee contracted
with a controlling stockholder for the sale of stock, payments to be made
in five annual installments. These payments were guaranteed by the
guarantor. No registration statement was in effect for the shares being
sold, because the guarantee-purchaser had agreed that the purchased
shares were being acquired for investment thus causing the transaction
to come within the section 4(2) private offering exemption. 2 However,
the exemption was violated when the guarantee-purchaser decided not
to hold the stock for investment, but instead sold to another who resold
the shares to the public on the American Stock Exchange. Thus, the
result was a sale of unregistered stock which did not fall within any ex-
emption; hence a section 5 violation which would ordinarily result in
section 12(1) liability.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964).
31. 244 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
32. The private offering exemption is very generally defined in § 4(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (1964), to be "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." This
has generally been interpreted to mean that the offerees be financially sophisticated, few in
number and take for investment purposes only. For a complete discussion of the private
offering exemption see SOWARDS, supra note 17, at § 4.02.
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However, in the instant case, the guarantor was seeking a remedy
under section 12(1) because of a section 5 violation occasioned by his
guarantee. The court held that no public interest would be served by
enabling the guarantee-purchaser who wrongfully caused the section 5
violation or his guarantor to be entitled to take advantage of section
12(1). On the contrary, to permit such parties to sue under 12(1) "would
supply a built-in defense to a purchaser, who by the very violation of
his agreement would at once effectively relieve himself of all his other
obligations thereunder." If a remedy were afforded such purchaser, it
would enable him to insure his investment against loss. If the price went
up, he would adhere to his agreement; but if the price went down, he
would sell a small portion of his purchase to the public and sue the seller
for the consideration paid. For these reasons, and others not here relevant,
the court correctly held that the guarantor and his guarantee were
liable under the stock purchase agreement.
C. Rule 10b-5
The once burning question of whether a civil suit may be maintained
by a purchaser or seller under Rule 10b-5 8 is now but a fast flickering
flame.84 No less than sixteen cases have discussed Rule 10b-5 during the
period covered by this survey."5 Generally, the availability of a civil
action under the Rule was usually never raised,86 or, if raised," quickly
33. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949), was adopted to effectuate § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). Rule lOb-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
34. For a complete discussion of this issue, see Klein, The Extension o a Private
Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors under SEC Rule lOb-5, 20 U. MiAmI L. Rv. 81
(1966).
35. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
1964); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Parker v. Baltimore Paint &
Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Col. 1965); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25
(D. Md. 1965); Glickman v. Schweichart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Weber
v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965): Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238
F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Rogers v. Crown Stove Works, 236 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill.
1964); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
36. E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339
F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
37. E.g., Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Carliner v.
Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965).
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dispensed with by citing a long line of cases beginning with Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co."5 Contrary to the summary treatment given the
question in these decisions, the court in Weber v. C.M.P. Corp.,89 devoted
much of its opinion to the problem. It first recognized that sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act are subject to certain restrictions not imposed
upon Rule 10b-5.'40 The court then reasoned that inasmuch as Rule 10b-5
did not expressly provide for civil liability as did sections 11 and 12, if
the Rule were merely duplicative of sections 11 and 12 it would be un-
reasonable to assume that Congress meant to expressly impose certain
restrictions in one instance and impliedly erase them in the next. There-
after the court proceeded to interpret Rule 10b-5 as requiring the plaintiff
to bear the burden of proving scienter, a requirement not imposed by
sections 11 and 12. It was therefore quite reasonable to assume that
Congress intended to grant a civil right of action free of the restrictions
imposed under sections 11 and 12 to a purchaser or seller who could
bear the added burden of proving scienter. Since the plaintiff had made
no allegation of scienter in various counts of the complaint, these counts
were dismissed with leave to amend.
Although Weber incorporated scienter into Rule 10b-5, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Stevens v. Vowell,4' implied the contrary.
The court stated that "it was not necessary to allege and prove common
law fraud to make out a case under the ... rule. It is only necessary to
prove one of the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of
fact or omission to state a material fact." '42 A subsequent district court
case43 within the Tenth Circuit refused to follow the Court of Appeals
apparent obliteration of the scienter requirement. It declared that,
"Stevens does not specifically consider the question and the dicta which
is the source of the plaintiff's contention does not.., require the adoption
of a ruling which is contrary to that . . . expressed in Trussell,"" [an
earlier district court case].
The controversy regarding scienter appears to emanate from the
three prohibitory clauses within the Rule. 5 Whereas clauses (1) and (3)
speak in terms of fraud, which implies scienter, clause (2), which was
referred to in Stevens v. Vowell,46 resembles the language used in sec-
tions 11 and 12, which do not require scienter.47 It would seem that the
38. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
39. 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
40. The important restrictions which §§ 11 and 12 are subject to are privity, the short
statute of limitations contained in § 13 and the obligation to furnish costs.
41. 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
42. Id. at 379.
43. Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965).
44. Id. at 270.
45. Supra note 33.
46. Supra note 41.
47. For further discussion on this thought see Klein, supra note 34.
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
courts, in their zeal to provide a logical rationale for granting civil redress
under Rule 10b-5, have either overlooked clause (2) or decided not to
grant a civil remedy to those plaintiffs proceeding under this clause
since it would be duplicative of sections 11 and 12.
In List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,4" the element of reliance was con-
sidered. The plaintiff urged that abandoning the requirement of reliance
would facilitate outsiders proving an insider's fraud and therefore ad-
vance the purposes of Rule 10b-5. Notwithstanding this possibility, the
court felt that it was an inadequate reason for reading the basic tort
principle of causation-in-fact out of the Rule. "The proper test is whether
the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently if the defendant
had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact."49 The court stated that the
reason for the reliance requirement is to certify that the defendant's
conduct actually caused the plaintiff's injury. But what of the situation
where a defendant-director's failure to make public certain facts causes
the price of the corporation's stock to fall, and shortly thereafter the
plaintiff-stockholder sells his shares-a sale that would have occurred
even if the defendant had fully disclosed? While it is true that the plain-
tiff did not rely upon the defendant's action, it is likewise true that were
it not for the defendant, the plaintiff would be a wealthier man.5"
Causation, or the lack of it, was the turning point in Barnett v.
Anaconda Co.5 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant-majority stock-
holder caused fraudulent proxy solicitations to be mailed in order to
obtain stockholder approval for a pending merger. Under the applicable
state law a two-thirds vote of the outstanding shares was required to
approve a corporate dissolution. The defendant held seventy-three per
cent of the outstanding shares. Thus, notwithstanding the fact the defen-
dant may have caused the fraudulent proxy statements to issue, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss since there was no causal con-
nection between the alleged fraud and the approval of the merger.52
The defendant owned more than enough shares to approve the merger
by himself; hence, even without the alleged fraud, the merger would
have occurred. In a similar case5" which also concerned the issuance of
fraudulent proxy statements to gain approval of a merger, the defendant
moved for a summary judgment and urged lack of causation. The de-
48. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
49. Id. at 463.
50. See Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 1361, 1366 (1965). See also Hoover
v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (refuting the "but for" test). But cf.,
Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238
F. Supp. 766, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
51. Supra note 50.
52. The court also dismissed allegations under §§ 14 and 17(a) of the Exchange Act on
the same grounds.
53. Eagle v. Horvath, supra note 50.
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fendants asserted that they owned more than the amount of common
stock necessary to approve the merger, and that through their control
of the corporation they had the power to redeem all of the outstanding
and issued preferred stock. The court denied the defendant's motion and
held that the fraudulent proxy statements might have caused the ap-
proval, since the defendants merely had the power to redeem the pre-
ferred shares, but never did so. Thus, if the preferred shareholders had
not been defrauded, they might have disapproved the merger.
As expected, the broad language of Rule 10b-5 has made it difficult
to determine the extent of its applicability. Although the Rule is the
most oft-used liability provision in either the 1933 or 1934 Act, a few
recent cases have evinced a tendency towards limiting its application. In
Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc.,54 the plaintiff brought a derivative action
against the defendant-directors for violations of Rule lob-5. The plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant caused the corporation to purchase shares
of stock from a director so as to provide the director with needed funds
and maintain the defendant's control over the corporation. The purchase
was made at a price equivalent to the market value. The court found
that while the defendant-directors might have breached their common
law duty to the corporation by diverting funds for noncorporate pur-
poses, they had not engaged in the fraud or deception required under the
Rule. Not every breach of a fiduciary duty will be cognizable under
the Rule.5
The court in Hoover v. Allen,5" went so far as to conclude "that
control acquired as part of a fraudulent scheme, of itself, is not an injury
to the corporation within the meaning of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
upon which a derivative action can be based." '57 This assumes that the
control was acquired without causing the corporation to pay excessive
sums for the purchased stock.
To conclude a discussion of Rule 10b-5 one should declare: "To be
continued." It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the Rule
is presently in a state of flux. It appears to be expanding into areas
specifically considered by other sections, such as sections 11 and 12,
notwithstanding the Weber case58 which attempted to differentiate these
sections from Rule 10b-5. Furthermore, in Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 9
the court stated that it was an open question whether fraud in a proxy
statement, a section 14(a) violation, would constitute a Rule 10b-5
violation.
54. 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965).
55. Accord, O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
56. 241 F. Supi. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
57. Id. at 228. But cf., Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
58. See notes 39 and 40 supra and accompanying text.
59. Supra note 51.
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In addition to the question of the scope of the Rule is the closely
related question of what elements are required to generate the remedies
thereunder. As previously discussed, the necessity for elements such as
reliance, causation, and fraud is unsure as is the definition of these ele-
ments. For example, the courts repeatedly declare that something less
than common law fraud is required, but how much less remains to be
defined. It will be interesting to note how the Supreme Court treats these
and other questions when it considers Rule 10b-5 for the first time.60
D. Statute of Limitations
Rule 10b-5 contains no statute of limitations, hence under the Rules
of Decision Act6' the applicable state statute of limitations governs.62
In Janigan v. Taylor,6" the defendant argued that pursuant to state law
the statute of limitations should not be tolled unless the cause of action
is affirmatively concealed. The court rejected that argument and held that
it would first look to the more liberal federal law to determine whether
the action was tolled, and then look to the state law to determine the
period of limitation. Under federal law the cause of action is automati-
cally concealed and does not arise until discovery.
In a subsequent case64 arising in the Southern District of Florida,
the court considered a similar argument. The defendant alleged that the
statute of limitations should not be tolled unless the cause of action
was concealed by trick or contrivance. Contrary to Janigan, the court
agreed with the defendant and cited prior cases that had likewise looked
to the state law to determine whether the statute of limitations had been
tolled. These statements may only be referred to as dicta, since the
holding of the court was that the plaintiff had sufficient information to
have reasonably discovered the cause of action. The court also dwelled
upon the fact that reasonable, rather than actual discovery, was all that
was required.
Unlike Rule 10b-5, section 11 is governed by section 1365 which
limits the time in which an action may be brought. The plaintiff in Escott
v. Barchris Construction Corp.," brought a class action within the time
specified in section 13. During the suit other members of the class sought
to intervene and the defendant objected on the grounds that the time
60. Perhaps the Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. litigation will supply this opportunity, but as
of this date the federal trial court for the Southern District of New York has not delivered
its opinion. For a complete discussion of this case up to the present time see Comment, 20
U. Mirmi L. REV. 939 (1965).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
62. Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
63. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965).
64. Supra note 62.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964).
66. 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965).
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limitation had run. The court in holding for the interveners declared
that the bringing of a class action tolled the time for all members of the
class. In light of this decision an unanswered question arises as to whether
the tolling of the time would enable other members of the class to bring
a new action after the close of the tolling suit. The concurring opinion
implied it would not.
E. Use of the Mails or Interstate Facilities
To invoke the civil liability provisions under either the Securities
Act or the Exchange Act, the plaintiff must successfully allege the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails.
Recent cases"7 have consistently held that it is not necessary for the
interstate facility or the mail to carry or include the fraudulent state-
ment. In Stevens v. Vowell,6" the court declared that "all that isrequired
is that such device or contrivance be used or employed in connection
with the use of instruments of interstate commerce or the mails." 69
Similarly in Kane v. Central Am. Mining and Oil, Inc.,70 the use of the
mails to notify the stockholders about the meeting was held sufficient
even though the actual fraud occurred at a stockholders' meeting.
Whereas the previous two cases dealt with Rule 10b-5, Nicewarner
v. Bleavins,71 concerned section 12(1) of the Securities Act. The entire
sale of the unregistered stock was transacted in "one room" without any
prior use of the mails. Shortly thereafter, the seller noticed an error in
the sales contract and made an interstate telephone call to the purchaser.
He advised him of the error and then wrote a letter explaining the proper
manner in which to execute the correction. The purchaser then mailed
the corrected instrument to the seller. Though subsequent to the sales
transaction, these contacts were held adequate to invoke section 12(1).
F. Insider Short-Swing Profits-Section 16(b)
Section 16(b) 72 of the Exchange Act provides that any profits real-
ized by certain corporate insiders 78 "from any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issues . . . within any
67. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see McDaniel v. United States, 343
F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1965).
68. 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965) (concerning Rule 10b-5).
69. Id. at 379.
70. 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
71. 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). Section 16 was amended by 78 Stat. 565 (1964), which
extended the section's application to certain over-the-counter securities.
73. An insider is defined in § 16(a) to be:
[Elvery person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security. ...
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period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by
the issuer .. . ." Despite the fact that the first sentence of section 16(b)
announces the purpose of the section to be that of preventing the unfair
use of inside information, profits realized by an insider are recoverable
even if he can absolutely establish that he did not make unfair use of
inside information.
Inasmuch as no profits are recoverable unless there has been a pur-
chase and sale, or sale and purchase within a six month period, many
suits have been won or lost depending upon the parties' ability to prove
the existence of a purchase or sale.74 In Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,75
the defendant-insider purchased convertible debentures in November;
four months later he converted the debentures to common stock, and
after another four months had elapsed he sold the common stock. In
arriving at the conclusion that the conversion constituted a sale, the
court analyzed three prior cases and found that two divergent roads had
been taken in determining whether a transaction was a purchase or sale.
The first case76 used an objective test; the -transaction was a purchase
or sale depending upon whether it fell within the broad definitional lan-
guage of sections 3(a)(13)77 or 3(a)(14).11
The second view was presented in an opinion written by Judge, now
Mr. Justice, Potter Stewart in which he favored a subjective test.79
Justice Stewart stated that " 'every transaction which can reasonably be
defined as a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind
which can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by Section
16(b).' "8o He proceeded to scrutinize the conversion and concluded that
it was not of a nature that would lend itself to the speculation encom-
passed by section 16(b). Thus the conversion did not amount to a sale
for purposes of the section."s The third case12 also used a subjective ap-
74. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), which specifically considered whether a conversion might constitute a sale.
75. 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
76. Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964): "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any
contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire."
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1964): "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract
to sell or otherwise dispose of."
79. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959).
80. Supra note 75, at 164.
81. The new security was the economic equivalent of the converted security, and the
conversion was involuntary in the sense that if the owner had not converted he would have
suffered a substantial economic loss.
82. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965). In this case the corporation
had two classes of stock outstanding, class A stock and convertible common stock. The
public held class A and the initial family owners of the corporation held the convertible
common. This was done to permit the corporation to pay dividends to the public and at
the same time retain the family's income in the business; otherwise the shares were identical.
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proach and found the conversion not to be a purchase within the meaning
of section 16(b).
After this thorough analysis the court concluded that the proper
procedure was to apply the objective test, 3 i.e., did the transaction fall
within sections 3(a) (13) or 3(a) (14).84 In this writer's opinion this
decision has only served to make an already rigid rule more rigid. It is
submitted that this decision will necessitate numerous rulings to exempt
those transactions which though a purchase or sale within sections
3(a) (13) or 3 (a) (14) bear no relation to the evils sought to be prevented
by section 16(b). 5 The subjective test proposed by Mr. Justice Stewart
does not impose the difficult task of determining an insider's good or bad
faith upon the courts; it merely obliges them to free from liability under
section 16(b) an insider who engaged in a transaction which could not
possibly lend itself to the evils sought to be prevented by the section. 6
The Heli-Coil case is also worthy of note for its "unique" method
of computing damages. It will be recalled that the defendant-insider con-
verted the debentures to common stock within six months of the deben-
ture purchase, and then sold the common stock within six months of the
conversion. Inasmuch as the court held the conversion to be a sale, one
would assume, as the trial court did," that part of the profits inuring to
the corporation would amount to the difference between the initial pur-
chase price of the debentures and their value on the conversion date.
The majority of the court held otherwise. It concluded that no sums were
recoverable for the difference between the purchase price and sales (con-
version) price of the debentures since according to the court no profits
were realized upon conversion.
In determining that nothing was realized the court looked to Web-
ster's International Dictionary 8 in which "to realize" is defined as: "To
convert an intangible right or property into a real (tangible) property;
hence to convert any kind of property into money." Since the insider re-
ceived common stock for a debenture no real (tangible) property was
received, and therefore nothing was realized. Though nothing was realized
upon conversion, this did not diminish the fact that it still constituted a
The family decided to sell a portion of their stock interest. To do so they had to convert
their common stock to class A stock since the public only owned class A stock.
This conversion was held not to be a purchase of the class A stock inasmuch as it was
merely a necessary steD in the sale of the common stock. Moreover, it did not interrupt the
continuity of the appellee's investment.
83. Accord, Pettys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965).
84. Supra notes 77-78.
85. Various rules have already been executed, e.g., Rule 16b-9, and others are in the
process. See the SEC's call for comments on a proposed rule governing conversions, SEC
Securities Act Release No. 7750, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,305 (1965).
86. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, supra note 75 (Judge Hastie's dissent).
87. Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963).
88. (2d ed. 1948).
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sale of the debentures and a purchase of the common stock. The common
stock was sold four months after the conversion and seven months after
the initial debenture purchase. Upon its sale the court held that the only
profit recoverable under section 16(b) was the difference between the
value of the common stock on the conversion date, and the price at which
the stock was subsequently sold.
Judge McLaughlin in his dissent disagreed with the method used to
compute damages and stated that it "is at odds with the conceded pur-
pose of the statute, utterly unrealistic and, in ascribing lack of realized
profit to the appellant on his debenture maneuver, is impossible to
follow."8 It is this writer's opinion that his statements are too kind.
It is agreed by all that the purpose of section 16(b) is to prevent profits
through short-swing speculation by insiders. The majority opinion agreed
that speculative short-swing profits can arise through a conversion, but
refused to include these profits as recoverable in a 16(b) action. A
simple example will serve to illustrate the futility of their method of com-
putation.
Assume a corporation has common and convertible preferred stock
outstanding, and because of an anti-dilution clause they both vary directly
in price. "I"-insider has some inside information which leads him to
believe that the value of the corporation's stock will double in two weeks.
"I" buys all the convertible preferred stock he can get. At the end of
two weeks "Ps" information proves correct, and he now wishes to sell
the stock and take his profit. "I" realizes he cannot sell the preferred
shares because this would be a purchase and sale of a security within
six months to which section 16(b) applies. But "I"-insider once at-
tended law school for a semester, and while pursuing his studies he hap-
pened upon Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster. ° Thus, he now recognizes that
all he needs to do is convert his preferred shares into common (at which
time no profits will be realized) and immediately thereafter sell the
common stock. The net result is that he will have successfully en-
gaged in short-swing speculations free of section 16(b).
Before leaving Heli-Coil, it should be pointed out that under the
court's test for realization, i.e., tangible property in exchange for intangi-
ble, an insider would never have to realize a profit within six months.
Instead of selling the "I" security of the "I" Corporation in which he is
an insider, all he need do is trade his "I" security for one of like value,
"Q" security, and sell "Q" security. The trade will not give rise to a
realized profit since he is receiving an intangible right, "Q" security, and
the sale of the "Q" shares will not activate section 16(b) since the seller
is not an insider in the "Q" Corporation.
89. Supra note 75, at 170.
90. Supra note 75.
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Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.91 considered an-
other aspect of computing damages under section 16(b). The damages
recoverable under this section have repeatedly been characterized as
non-penal, remedial compensation to protect the corporation and its in-
vestors. To determine the amount of profits recoverable the courts have
applied a rule described as the lowest-price-in and highest-price-out
(LIHO) within six months. As the rule commands, the lowest price pur-
chases are matched against the highest price sales to determine the
profits recoverable. This rule was created to prevent the insider from
matching his sales with high price purchases, or even purchases made
over six months previously, and thereby relieve himself of any liability.
The trial court in Western Auto92 examined the previous cases which had
applied LIHO. In those cases the defendant attempted to match the sales
with purchases dating back further than six months. The courts refused
to permit this obvious abuse of section 16(b) and disgorged all possible
profits by LIHO. In the instant case the defendant did not seek to
match its sales with old purchases, on the contrary it persuaded the
court to adopt the last-in first-out (LIFO) rule. Under this system the
sales are matched with the most recent purchases. This prevents a de-
fendant-insider from matching purchases and sales in order to avoid
liability, and at the same time greatly diminishes the gross inequities
that might arise under LIHO.9 LIFO also adheres to the announced
purpose of remedial compensation rather than penal impositions. Un-
fortunately, the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit94 reversed the
trial court without refuting its well-reasoned opinion. The appellate
court merely mechanically repeated the LIHO rule and the trite phrases
about scuttling the effectiveness of section 16(b) by arbitrary matching
which is inapplicable to the LIFO system.
Western Auto also held that the right to sue under section 16(b)
survived the issuer in a merger and inured to the successor corporation.
Section 16(b) was defined as a tort action which safeguarded property
rights, and at common law this type of action survived the injured party.
Moreover, the court held the right to sue was assignable.
91. 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965).
92. 231 F. Supp. 456 (D. Minn. 1964).
93. It is mathematically possible to compel an insider who has suffered a net financial
loss to pay back his "profits" under the LIHO method of computation. Furthermore, § 16(b)
is designed to prevent only short-swing profits. In the factual situation presented below, the
only opportunity for short-swing profits occurred on 1/1/66, but under, LIHO the insider
would be required to pay $5 profit for a sale that afforded no opportunity for short-swing
profits. This would not occur under LIFO.
"I" purchased 10 shares at $10 in 1959.
Purchases Sales
1/1/66 1 share at $15 1 share at $15
5/1/66 1 share at $20
94. Supra note 91.
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Section 16(b) will continue to generate litigation since the results
achieved by its application often materially differ from its announced
purpose; namely to prevent "the unfair use of inside information. .. ."
However, because the section applies notwithstanding the unfair use
of inside information, many innocent insiders suffer along with the guilty.
This possibility was well known to Congress, but it was felt that the
hardship would have to be borne to effectively reduce short-swing specu-
lation by insiders.95 This decision was reached because of the enormous
difficulty encountered when attempting to prove bad faith or the unfair
use of inside information.
While cognizant of the possible hardships that must be borne, the
courts should remain alert to those cases which present no possible op-
portunity for short-swing speculation. Though it is often easier to
mechanically look for a "purchase" and "sale," a thorough analysis of
the transaction to determine whether it is within the scope of section
16(b) will result in the more just decision.
The same holds true when assessing damages. Although a conversion
may not meet "Mr. Webster's" definition of realization, if such a con-
version provides the opportunity to acquire short-swing profits, these
profits should be recoverable under section 16(b).
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Revocation of Broker-Dealer Licenses
In Tager v. SEC,9" the petitioner sought to review an order of the
SEC which revoked his registration as a broker and dealer and expelled
him from membership in the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD). The authority for the action by the SEC was contained in
section 15 (b) 97 of the 1934 Act which provided for such action if a broker
or dealer "has willfully violated any provisions of the Securities Act of
1933, or of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation thereunder." The
petitioner argued that he had not acted willfully since he did not under-
stand his acts to be manipulative. The court rejected this argument declar-
ing: "It has been uniformly held that 'willfully' in this context means
intentionally committing the act which constitutes the violation."9 "
B. Consitutionality of an NASD Tribunal
In a proceeding99 to review an order of the SEC which dismissed an
application to review a disciplinary action against the petitioner by the
95. Heli-Coil Cori). v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 166 n.13 (3d Cir. 1965).
96. 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 780(b) (1964).
98. Supra note 96, at 8. Accord, Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
99. Nassau Sec. Serv. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1965).
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NASD, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of a NASD tribunal.
The attack was grounded upon the fact that he was tried by his com-
petitors. While the court "admitted to a certain uneasiness about their
[the competitors'] possible lack of disinterestedness," it rejected the
challenge because NASD rules and disciplinary actions are subject to
full review by the SEC. These tribunals are analogous to those which act
in disbarment proceedings in the legal community.
C. The SEC As The Defendant
In Holmes v. Eddy,'01 the plaintiff sued the SEC and members of its
staff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had conspired to circulate,
and had circulated publicly, untruths about the plaintiff. The decision
of the court was that the defendants were acting within the scope of
their employment in performing investigatory tasks, and were therefore
not liable to the plaintiff.
V. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
A. Extraterritorial Service
Section 2 7101 of the Exchange Act provides that in "any suit or action
to enforce any liability or duty created by this title ... process in such
cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." The provision
relieves a plaintiff of the standard territorial service of process limitation.
Standing alone this nationwide or extraterritorial service appears clear
enough, but when coupled with the theory of "pendent jurisdiction" the
area becomes hazy.
Under the theory of "pendent jurisdiction" a federal court may have
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that does not raise a federal
question if it is closely related to a claim brought in the same suit that
does raise a federal question.' 2 The perplexing question is whether a
100. 341 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1965).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
102. The vague and difficult determination of whether a claim is pendent or not was
considered in Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.V. 1965) and United
Industrial Corp. v. Nuclear Corp., 237 F. Supp. 971 (D. Del. 1964). In Glickman, the
court employed a very subjective test: would there be a substantial commitment of fed-
eral judicial resources to the nonfederal claim at the time the nonfederal claim is decided
so that remittance of the nonfederal claim to a state court would occasion a senseless dupli-
cation of judicial and litigant effort. The court in United Industrial Corp., applied the
test used in the leading case of Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933). The test re-
quires the court to distinguish
between a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are
alleged, only one of which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate
and distinct causes of action are alleged, only one of which is federal in character.
In the former ... the federal court ... may ... dispose of the case upon the non-
federal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the nonfederal cause of action.
See also WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTs § 19 (1963).
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court is granted personal jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes
of the pendent claim where he has been served in a district other than
that of the forum. In Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,108 the court
held that it did not have jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to
the pendent claim."°4 Section 27 of the Exchange Act expressly provided
for nationwide service for federal claims but was silent as to pendent
claims. The court stated that since the limits of service of process
have been meticulously guarded extensions by way of extraterritorial
service should not be implied. The court further declared that their rul-
ing would not create judicial waste by having to relitigate the same
issues when seeking recovery under the pendent claim in another court
since the doctrine of collateral estoppel could be used in the second suit.
Contrary to the Trussell decision, the court in Kane v. Central Am.
Mining & Oil, Inc.1' felt that the dual considerations of judicial econ-
omy and convenience of the parties required that extraterritorial service
be sustained as to non-federal pendent claims.
The cases illustrate the present split of authority." 6 It is submitted
that in light of the present trend toward nationwide service as evidenced
by nonresident motorist, nonresident business, and unauthorized insurer
statutes, the authorities will finally resolve the question in favor of per-
mitting the extraterritorial service for pendent claims.
The Kane case'017 demonstrated still another aspect of extraterritorial
service. One of the defendants was a corporation which was incorporated
in Panama and which owned mines in Honduras. Section 27 provides that
a defendant may be served wherever it may be "found." The court held
that this provision was to be liberally construed, and notwithstanding the
fact that the corporation may not have been "doing business" within New
York, it was held to be "found" there. The significant corporate contacts
with New York were that the entire Board of Directors resided there,
and that special meetings of both stockholders and directors had been
held in New York. The court interpreted the Exchange Act to have a
broad remedial purpose and felt that to restrict its application would
do violence to the spirit in which it was passed.
B. Venue
Section 27 of the Exchange Act, discussed previously relative to
extraterritorial service, also contains the venue provision. It provides
103. 236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964).
104. Accord, Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo.
1965).
105. 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
106. For a list of other cases illustrating the present split of authority, see note 97,
supra at 803-4.
107. Supra note 99.
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that any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty under the Act
must be brought in a district where: (1) the act or transaction constituting
the violation occurred, (2) a defendant is found, (3) a defendant is an
inhabitant, or (4) a defendant transacts business.
Considering the first possibility, namely, where the violation oc-
curred, the court in Blau v. Lamb"°8 held that the plaintiff could recover
for damages on all sales constituting a violation whether made within or
without the forum's district. This was true notwithstanding the fact that
the only basis for venue were the sales made within the forum's district.
Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc. °9 also discussed the first possi-
bility. The problem in the case was to ascertain where the violation oc-
curred. The court determined that despite the fact that certain mailed
letters contained no fraudulent statements, the letters did constitute a
step in the fraudulent scheme, 1 ' and therefore a violation had occurred
at the place where the letters were deposited in the mail.
The second and fourth opportunities for venue were analyzed in
United Industrial Corp. v. Nuclear Corp. of America."' As to the first
defendant, the plaintiff maintained that he had served him where he was
"found." Although the defendant was not personally within the district,
the plaintiff urged that the defendant was "found" there because he
owned property in the district. The court rejected this argument and
pointed out that the plaintiff had previously signed an affidavit to procure
the issuance of a writ of attachment which stated that the defendant was
a nonresident and "could not be found." Next the court considered the
plaintiff's claim of proper venue for the second defendant. This claim was
based on the contention that the defendant was "transacting business"
in the district. Inasmuch as the court had no cases discussing this phrase
under the Exchange Act, it looked to cases interpreting the same phrase
within the Securities and Clayton Acts. Although the determination is
always a question of fact, the court deduced the following set of stan-
dards: the activities must constitute a substantial part of the defendant's
ordinary business, be continuous, and exist at the time of suit and at least
for some duration. In the instant case the plaintiff failed to bear his bur-
den of proof and the action against the defendant was dismissed.
At the beginning of this article the various sections of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act were said to be the tortured victim of a
frustrated advocate. The following case".2 conclusively illustrates this
point and to even the most cursory reader the section cries out in pain.
108. 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
109. Supra note 99.
110. The letters requested the stockholders to attend a meeting which was designed
to give the defendants control of the corporation.
111. 237 F. Supp. 971 (D. Del. 1964).
112. United States v. Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y, 1965).
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The defendant was charged with the crime of having violated section
5(a)(2) of the Securities Act. The section provides:
5 (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security,
it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails...
any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery
after sale. (Emphasis added.)
The defendant moved to dismiss one of the counts for lack of venue
based upon the contention that the violation did not occur in the forum.
The count charged that the defendant "caused" the delivery of a sight
draft to be made in the forum's district. The defendant maintained that
section 5(a) (2) couched two separate crimes; one "to carry," and the
other "to cause to be carried." "[T]he crime of 'carriage' is a continuing
one which commences at the place of deposit and continues along the
route to the mail's final destination, whereas the crime of 'causation' is
static, being complete at the time and place where the mailed matter is
deposited." ' Thus, since the defendant was charged with "causation"
and since he mailed the letter from outside the forum, there was no
violation within the forum upon which venue could rest. As expected
the court rejected this strained interpretation of section 5 (a) (2) in what
appeared to this writer to be an all too patient opinion.
It is essential that the bench remain constantly alert, so as to dis-
tinguish between those innovations which seek to evade the purpose of
the law, and those which seek to promote it.
113. Id. at 749.
